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Abstract
We argue that, by supporting a mixture of “compositional” and “structural” styles of proof,
sequent-based proof systems provide a useful framework for the formal verification of processes.
As a worked example, we present a sequent calculus for establishing that processes satisfy assertions
in Hennessy–Milner logic. The main novelty lies in the use of the operational semantics to derive in-
troduction rules, on the left and right of sequents, for the operators of the process calculus. This gives
a generic proof system applicable to any process algebra with an operational semantics specified
in the GSOS format. Using a general algebraic notion of GSOS model, we prove a completeness
theorem for the cut-free fragment of the proof system, thereby establishing the admissibility of the
cut rule. Under mild (and necessary) conditions on the process algebra, an ω-completeness result,
relative to the “intended” model of closed process terms, follows.
© 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
This paper is concerned with the construction of proof systems for the formal verific-
ation of programs, specifically of concurrent processes. The main thesis is that Gentzen’s
sequent calculus [14] provides an ideal foundation upon which to base such systems. This
is illustrated by a substantial worked example: a sequent-based proof system for estab-
lishing that processes with operational semantics specified in the GSOS format [5] satisfy
properties of Hennessy–Milner logic [16]. We end the paper with a discussion of how the
approach extends to other programming paradigms and to more powerful logics.
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There are several desirable properties that one might require of any proof system for
program verification. First, concerning the basic logical properties of the system:
Soundness: everything provable is true. We take this as the sine qua non of formal verific-
ation.
Completeness: everything true is provable. For expressive programming languages and
logics this will be unachievable. Nevertheless, it is vital that the proof system is sufficiently
complete to establish verification goals that occur in practice. Moreover, informative re-
stricted completeness theorems may be available as a mathematical indication of the power
of the system.
Of practical importance is that the proof system should permit useful methods of reas-
oning. We identify three independent requirements here.
Compositional reasoning. Often, in order to verify that a compound program satisfies a
property, one would like to verify that its component subprograms independently satisfy
properties that are together sufficient to establish the original goal. For example, to verify
that a parallel composition p|q satisfies a property A, one might verify that p satisfies some
property B1 and that q satisfies some property B2, where these two facts together imply that
p|q indeed satisfies A. The importance of such compositional reasoning is that it allows
the verification task to be split up into independent goals that can be verified separately.
This possibility provides a foundation for the modular development and verification of
software.
Structural reasoning. It should be possible to verify a goal by breaking the goal down
into subgoals obtained via a canonical decomposition of the original goal based on its
syntactic structure. Such structural methods support a natural goal-directed approach to
proof construction. They are thus important in the provision of proof support by proof
assistants and theorem provers, and especially vital to the efficient implementation of proof
search algorithms.
Natural reasoning. In addition, one would like the proof system to support natural and in-
tuitive methods of reasoning. Ideally, it should be possible for a formal proof of correctness
to closely adhere to the natural informal argument justifying correctness.
We believe that it is important for a proof system to fulfill all three requirements. In-
deed, significant though compositional methods undoubtedly are, there is no reason at
all to require every proof step to be compositional. Compositionality should be used at
natural points, where a program divides into modules, and where the independent verific-
ation of these modules is desirable. But, within the verification of any individual module
itself, it may well be useful to maintain logical dependencies between subcomponents,
and these dependencies might be less easily expressed if compositional methods were
enforced throughout the verification process. Furthermore, there is no general guarantee
that compositional reasoning is always applicable. For example, there is no reason for it
to always be possible to reduce a goal “p|q satisfies A” to two independent goals of the
form “p satisfies B1” and “q satisfies B2”. Thus, although it is essential for a proof system
to support compositional reasoning, this should not be the only method of verification
permitted.
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Finally, another general concern is that, preferably, the proof system should be derived
from the programming language and logic in a principled way. In such cases there is better
chance of being able to adapt or extend the system to deal with new programming language
features and different logical primitives.
We now present a very general argument that sequent calculus provides an excellent
foundation for the development of proof systems with the above properties. Suppose we
have a language for expressing processes (or programs), and a logic for expressing prop-
erties of them. Then the basic relation of interest is the satisfaction relation between
processes and properties: process p satisfies property A. We outline the potential virtues
of having a proof system based on sequents of the form  ⇒  where  and  are
sets of assertions, including a basic assertion form, p :A, expressing the above satisfaction
relation. As usual, a sequent  ⇒  should be understood as expressing the implication:
if all the assertions in  are true then so is at least one of the assertions in .
First, the sequent-based formalism is rich enough to express diverse types of verification
goal.
Ordinary goals. The ordinary verification goal, of establishing that process p satisfies
property A, is expressed by the sequent ⇒ p :A. The verification task is then to construct
a proof of this sequent.
Parametrized goals. By allowing variables ranging over processes in assertions, one can
express parametrized verification goals of the form
x1 :B1, . . . , xn :Bn ⇒ p(x1, . . . , xn) :A
This sequent states that if the parameters x1, . . . , xn in p are instantiated with processes
q1, . . . , qn satisfying B1, . . . , Bn respectively, then the resulting compound process
p(q1, . . . , qn) satisfies A.
Further, sequent-calculus-based proof systems address the various stylistic requirements
concerning reasoning methods.
Compositional reasoning. Parametrized verification goals can be used to support com-
positional reasoning. By combining the familiar cut and substitution rules from sequent
calculus, one obtains derived rules of the form
⇒ q1 :B1 · · · ⇒ qn :Bn x1 :B1, . . . , xn :Bn ⇒ p(x1, . . . , xn) :A
⇒ p(q1, . . . , qn) :A
The above rule reduces the goal of showing that a compound process p(q1, . . . , qn) satis-
fies property A to individual subgoals for its component subprocesses q1, . . . , qn, together
with an additional parametrized goal required to justify the choice of B1, . . . , Bn. This ap-
proach to compositionality was proposed by Stirling [25], who presented a proof calculus
based on primitive decomposition rules of this form for CCS parallel compositions q1|q2.
In our approach, such rules arise automatically as a consequence of having a sequent-based
proof system allowing the expression of general parametrized verification goals.
Structural reasoning. The primitive proof rules of sequent calculus are introduction rules,
on the left and right of sequents, for logical connectives. Such proof rules exactly support
a structural, goal-directed form of reasoning. Moreover, if a cut-elimination theorem is
available then structural reasoning is sufficient for establishing any provable goal.
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Natural reasoning. Each primitive proof rule of sequent calculus embodies in a direct
way the meaning of the logical connective that the rule represents. This feature makes it
plausible that natural informal proofs that a process satisfies a property, whose primitive
steps should all be self-explanatory, might have close formal analogues. Indeed, a wide
body of research, undertaken using the many proof assistants based on sequent calculi,
suggests that such systems do allow direct formalizations of natural arguments, modulo
the minor convolution of writing proofs in a goal-directed sequent style, rather than in a
natural deduction style.
There is one major issue, however, that has not been addressed in the discussion above.
We have argued that the compositional, structural and naturalness aspects of sequent-based
proof follow from properties of the basic sequent calculus rule set, including “structural
rules”1 (e.g. cut) and logical rules. However, we are here envisaging an applied sequent
calculus with sequents composed of verification assertions, rather than a pure logical cal-
culus. Such a system cannot be based on logical rules alone. One also needs rules to relate
processes (or programs) to their logical properties. The question thus arises as to whether
it is possible to provide such applied proof systems without breaking the fundamental
structural properties of sequent calculus.
In this paper we show that this is indeed possible, at least for processes with an
operational semantics specified in the GSOS format, and for propositional modal logic
(Hennessy–Milner logic [16]). Our method of approach concerns adding introduction rules,
on the left and right of sequents, for process operators, in addition to the standard rules for
the logical connectives. These proof rules for process operators are derived in a principled
way directly from the operational semantics. Thus the approach also provides a modular
proof system, easily adaptable to a range of process algebras.
At the end of the paper we include an epilogue discussing work that has been done,
since the research in this paper was first carried out, towards adapting our approach to
richer program logics and other programming paradigms.
2. Proof rules for modalities and process operators
In this section we present an informal introduction to our approach of incorporating
proof rules for modalities and process operators into the sequent calculus. A detailed
technical treatment is given in Section 4.
As motivated in Section 1, the proof system is a sequent calculus with sequents of the
form  ⇒  where  and  are finite sets of assertions. Our main assertion form in
p : A, where p is term representing a process and A is a formula of Hennessy–Milner
logic [16]. For illustrative purposes, we use CCS [18] as the process language in this
section. As discussed in Section 1, we allow process terms to contain free process variables.
The task we address is how to give proof rules for the logic and for the process operators.
We consider each issue in turn.
For the formulas of Hennessy–Milner logic we need proof rules both for the proposi-
tional connectives and for the modalities. The rules for the former are standard.
1 There is a slightly unfortunate clash between our use of “structural reasoning” and the sequent calculus
notion of “structural rule”. For us, structural reasoning is implemented by the non-structural rules of sequent
calculus. Our terminology is chosen to be consistent with the sense of “structural” in “structural operational
semantics”, in which the premises of a rule are obtained by a similar syntactic decomposition of the conclusion.
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For the modalities, we give rules which reflect in as direct a way as possible their meanings.
For example, in the case of the necessity modality, we have that p satisfies [a]A (where a
is some action) if and only if, for every process q such that p can perform a to become q
(notation p a→q), it holds that q satisfies A. In order to translate this in terms of primitive
rules it is necessary to have a further assertion form expressing that p a→q for processes p
and q. Then one has natural rules:
 ⇒ p a→q,  , q :A ⇒ 
, p : [a]A ⇒ 
, p
a→x ⇒ x :A, 
 ⇒ p : [a]A, 
(1)
where, in the right-hand rule, x is a variable (ranging over processes) that does not appear
in the concluding sequent of the rule, thus x represents an arbitrary process to which p can
evolve via a.
The rules for process operators are derived from the operational semantics of the process
algebra, making crucial use of the presence of p a→q assertions. Indeed, the right-hand
rules are copied directly from the operational semantics. For example, the rules for the
CCS prefix and sum operators [18] are:
 ⇒ a.p a→p, 
 ⇒ p a→p′, 
 ⇒ p + q a→p′, 
 ⇒ q a→q ′, 
 ⇒ p + q a→q ′, 
The rules for introducing process operators on the left express that an action
f (p1, . . . , pk)
a→r may only happen if it is derivable via one of the operational rules for
f . For example, for the prefix, zero and sum operators of CCS, this property is expressed
by the following rules:
[p, r] ⇒ [p, r]
[r, p], a.p a→r ⇒ [r, p]
a /= b
, a.p
b→r ⇒ 
, 0 a→r ⇒ 
, p
a→r ⇒  , q a→r ⇒ 
, p + q a→r ⇒ 
Here we write [p, r] for [p/x, q/y], where neither x nor y occur in p and r . Then
[r, p] is simply [r/x, p/y]. Equivalently, one can understand [p, r] as simply a set of
assertions with some (but not necessarily all) occurrences of p and q highlighted, in which
case [r, p] is then obtained by replacing the distinguished occurrences of p with r , and
vice versa. Incidentally, we have not mentioned a right-hand rule for zero because it does
not have one.
All the rules we have discussed so far have the properties we identified in Section 1
as being desirable of structural reasoning. In the modality rules, the formula [a]A in the
rule conclusion is decomposed to the formula A in the premise. In the operational rules, a
conclusion involving a process f (p1, . . . , pk) is derived from premises mentioning only
its arguments p1, . . . , pk .
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One would like some further assurance that the left and right rules for process operators
are well chosen. One yardstick by which this can be judged, is whether they properly com-
plement each other in the sense of supporting local cut-elimination steps. Unfortunately, the
rules formulated above do not support such proof reductions. For example, the following
derivation just uses the above process rules and cut:
b.0 c→0 ⇒
c.0 c→0, a.b.0 a→c.0 ⇒ ⇒ c.0 c→0
cut
a.b.0 a→c.0 ⇒
but there is no way of eliminating cut from the derivation. The sequents a.b.0 a→
x, a.c.0 a→x ⇒ and a.b.0 + c.d.0 a→x, a.b.0 + c.d.0 c→x ⇒ give other examples of
similar phenomena. This failure of cut-elimination does not seem to be a result of the
particular formulation of the rules, but rather an unavoidable problem for the sequents
considered above. As seems desirable, all the rules are sound (in a sense explained in
Section 4) relative to models in which bisimilar processes are identified. So the only way to
show the impossibility of a.p a→q is to show that p and q are not bisimilar. This involves
considering the hereditary behaviour of p and q, and a cut is required to effect such an
argument.
Rather than changing the rules, we address the non-eliminability of cut by restricting
the class of sequents. Serendipitously, it turns out that if one imposes certain natural struc-
tural requirements on sequents (excluding, amongst others, the sequents above) then a full
cut-elimination result holds for the proof system. This means that structural reasoning is
alone sufficient for establishing any goal. Of course this result in no way devalues the
importance of compositional reasoning, which does require cut. The situation is analogous
to that for ordinary logic, where the cut rule is essential for structuring proofs using lem-
mas, and where the eliminability of cut in no way undermines the usefulness of lemmas in
proofs.
In Section 4, we present our approach in detail. There, we formulate a sequent calculus
for any process algebra whose operational semantics is specified in the GSOS format [5].
The choice of GSOS format is motivated by its wide expressivity. As is argued in [5], the
GSOS format apparently forms the largest class of operational rule that enjoys certain basic
sanity properties. In particular, GSOS rules generate transition systems with finite image,
and strong bisimulation is a congruence relative to any GSOS operator. In this paper, a
further benefit of the use of GSOS systems is that their generic rule format allows us to
explicitly exhibit the uniformity in our method of deriving sequent calculus proof rules
from operational semantics.
The main result of Section 4 is a completeness theorem for the sequent calculus (The-
orem 2), relative to a natural algebraic notion of GSOS model introduced in Section 3.
The completeness theorem is for a cut-free proof system. Thus the admissibility of the cut
rule is obtained as a corollary of completeness (Corollary 1). Proving completeness is the
central technical task of the paper, and Section 5 is devoted to this.
For the purpose of process verification, one is interested in having completeness relative
to the “intended” model, given by the process calculus itself, rather than relative to a
general class of models. In Section 6, we show that, for certain sequents, the proof system
is indeed complete for deriving truth in the intended model (Theorem 3). Furthermore, we
give necessary and sufficient conditions for an ω-completeness result to hold (Theorem 4).
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The latter result implies, as a special case, that the sequent calculus is complete for deriving
parametrized verification goals in the sense of Section 1.
3. Technical preliminaries
This section provides the technical background for the rest of the paper. We review the
GSOS rule format for specifying the operational semantics of processes [5], we introduce
a general algebraic notion of GSOS model, we recall the stratified definition of strong
bisimilarity, we review Hennessy–Milner logic and its relationship to bisimilarity [16],
and we establish basic properties of the class of finite processes.
First some notational and terminological preliminaries. Given a binary relation R, we
write R+ for its transitive closure. We say that R is well-founded if there is no infinite
sequence (xi) with xi+1Rxi for all i. Given a set X we write P (X) for the powerset of
X, and Pfin(X) for the finite powerset. We say that a property holds for almost all natural
numbers, to mean that it holds for all but finitely many numbers.
We use x, y, z, . . . to range over a countably infinite set, Vars, of process variables.
We use f, g, . . . to range over a countable set of operator symbols each of which has
an associated arity  0. We use p, q, r, . . . to range over process terms built from the
operators and variables in the standard way, respecting arities. We write r(x) to mean that
all the variables of r are contained in the vector of distinct variables x; in which case, given
a vector of process terms, p, of the same length as x, we write r( p) for the process term
obtained by the evident substitution. We write Vars(p) for the set of variables appearing in
p. We say that p is closed if Vars(p) = ∅. For V ⊆ Vars, we write TermsV for the set of
all terms p with Vars(p) ⊆ V .
A substitution function, σ , is a total function from variables to process terms. We also
write σ for the unique homomorphism on process terms determined by a substitution
function. Thus σ(p) means the term obtained by substituting σ(x) for each variable x in p.
The operational semantics is to be specified by a GSOS system [5]. We use a, b, c, . . .
to range over a finite set, Act, of actions. A GSOS rule has the form:
{
xi
aij→yij
}1ik
1jmi
{
xi
bij

}1ik
1jni
f (x1, . . . , xk)
c→r(x, y)
(2)
where: all the variables are distinct; x and y are the vectors of all xi and yij variables
respectively; mi, ni  0; and k is the arity of f . We say that f is the operator of the rule
and c is its action. A GSOS system, R, is given by a set of GSOS rules containing, for
each operator-action pair f, c, only a finite number of rules with operator f and action c.
Henceforth, we assume given a fixed GSOS system, R.
Normally a GSOS system is used to determine a labelled transition system between
closed processes giving their operational behaviour. We shall be interested in this transition
system as one intended model amongst a wider class of models, see Definition 3.1. First,
some preliminary definitions. A (labelled) transition system is a structure of the form T =
(|T |, { a→T }a∈Act) where: |T | is a set (of states); and a→T is a binary relation on |T | for
each action a. We use s, t, . . . to range over states of transition systems, and we often
write s ∈ T rather than s ∈ |T |. We write s aT if there does not exist t such that s a→T t .
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For s ∈ T define succa(s) = {t | s a→T t}. We say that T is image finite if, for each state
s ∈ T , the set⋃a∈Act succa(s) is finite.
A premodel is a structure T = (|T |, { a→T }, {fT }) where: (|T |, { a→T }) is a transition
system; and fT is a k-ary function on |T | for each operator f of arity k. Given premod-
els S, T , we say a binary relation R ⊆ |S| × |T | is a generalized congruence if, for all
s1, . . . sk ∈ |S| and t1, . . . , tk ∈ |T |, and k-ary f , it holds that R(fS(s1, . . . , sk),
fT (t1, . . . , tk)) whenever R(si, ti) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Given a premodel T , an environment is a function from process variables to |T |. Given
an environment γ , we write γ [x 	→ t] for the environment obtained from γ by updating
the value at x to t . An environment γ induces a function mapping each process term p to
a state γ (p) ∈ |T |, defined inductively by
γ (f (p1, . . . , pk)) = fT (γ (p1), . . . , γ (pk)),
for each operator f . Clearly γ (p) depends only on the values taken by γ on Vars(p).
Often, rather than dealing with environments directly, we shall more conveniently write
p(t1, . . . , tk) for the value γ (p) of a term p(x1, . . . , xk) in any environment γ with
γ (x1) = t1 and . . . and γ (xk) = tk .
Definition 3.1 (GSOS model). We say that a premodel T is a model if it holds that
f (s1, . . . , sk)
c→T s′ if and only if there exists a rule in R, of the form (2) above, and
there exist states {tij }1jni1ik such that:
(1) for all i, j with 1  i  k and 1  j  mi , it holds that si
aij→T tij ;
(2) for all i, j with 1  i  k and 1  j  ni , it holds that si
bij
T ; and
(3) s′ = r(s, t).
The above definition essentially implements the soundness and witnessing properties of [5,
Section 4.3] within a general algebraic framework.
Of particular interest are term models. The existence and uniqueness of these is given
by the result below.
Proposition 3.2. For any V ⊆ Vars, and B ⊆ V × Act × TermsV , there is a unique model
T satisfying: |T | = TermsV ; for each operator f of arity k, it holds that fT (p1, . . . , pk) =
f (p1, . . . , pk); and x a→T p if and only if (x, a, p) ∈ B.
Proof. One shows, by an easy structural induction on a term p, that the transitions out of
p are uniquely determined by the initial data. 
The V = ∅ case of the proposition is just Lemma 4.3.9 of [5]. We refer to this model
as the closed term model, and we write R for it. In cases in which one thinks of R as
specifying a complete self-contained language, it is natural to think of the closed term
model as the “intended” operational model ofR. Our general notion of model also includes
all quotients of the closed term models of disjoint extensions of R, in the sense of [1,
Def. 2.11], by congruence relations contained in bisimilarity. Of course, there are many
non-term models too.
In Theorem 5.1.1 of [5], it is observed that the closed term model is image finite.
This property does not, of course, hold for arbitrary models. So we shall avoid making
assumptions that depend upon image finiteness.
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One of the basic results about GSOS systems is that bisimulation is a conguence on
closed terms, [5, Theorem 5.1.2]. We shall need a stratified generalization of this result to
arbitrary GSOS models, Proposition 3.4. Accordingly, we recall the relation ∼ of (strong)
bisimilarity between states of transition systems, and its ordinal-indexed approximations
∼α , see e.g. [18, Section 10.4]. For transition systems S and T and ordinals α, the relation
∼STα between |S| and |T | is defined by:
s ∼STα+1 t iff s a→S s′ implies ∃t ′ such that t a→T t ′ and s′ ∼STα t ′, and
t
a→T t ′ implies ∃s′ such that s a→S s′ and s′ ∼STα t ′,
s ∼STλ t iff for all α < λ, s ∼STα t , when λ is a limit ordinal.
Note that, vacuously, s ∼ST0 t always holds. Also s ∼STα t implies s ∼STα′ t , for all ordinals
α′  α. Bisimilarity is defined by:
s ∼ST t iff for all ordinals α, s ∼STα t .
Note that the bisimilarity relation ∼ST always coincides with ∼STα for some sufficiently
large α; for example, take α to be the smallest cardinal strictly greater than the cardinality
of P (|S| × |T |).2 This allows results about ∼ST to be inferred easily from properties of
the ∼STα relations. For example, one obtains the fixed-point property of ∼ST .
s ∼ST t iff s a→S s′ implies ∃t ′ such that t a→T t ′ and s′ ∼ST t ′, and
t
a→T t ′ implies ∃s′ such that s a→S s′ and s′ ∼ST t ′.
(3)
Similarly, one immediately derives the analogues for ∼ST of Propositions 3.3 and 3.4.
Proposition 3.3
(1) For all s ∈ S, it holds that s ∼SSα s.
(2) If s ∼STα t then t ∼T Sα s.
(3) If s ∼SS′α s′ and s′ ∼S′S′′α s′′ then s ∼SS′′α s′′.
The proof is both standard and routine, so omitted.
Proposition 3.4. If S and T are models then ∼STα is a generalized congruence.
In the proof, and henceforth, we shall drop superscripts on the ∼STα (and ∼ST ) relations,
as they can always be inferred from the context.
Proof. By transfinite induction on α. The case for a limit ordinal is trivial, as generalized
congruences are closed under intersection. To show the result for successor ordinals, as-
sume that ∼α is a generalized congruence and suppose si ∼α+1 ti , for all i with 1  i  k.
We must show that f (s1, . . . , sk) ∼α+1 f (t1, . . . , tk).
2 If S and T are image finite then α can be taken to be ω, see [16, Theorem 2.1].
296 A. Simpson / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 60–61 (2004) 287–322
Suppose f (s1, . . . , sk)
c→S s′. We must find t ′ such that f (t1, . . . , tk) c→T t ′ and s′ ∼α
t ′. By the definition of model, there exists a rule in R of the form (2) above and there exist
{s′′ij }1jniaik such that:
(1) si
aij→S s′′ij , for all i, j with 1  i  k and 1  j  mi ;
(2) si
bij
S , for all i, j ′ where 1  i  k and 1  j ′  ni ; and
(3) s′ = r(s, s′′).
For each i, j as above, we have si ∼α+1 ti , so, by 1, there exists tij such that ti aij→S t ′′ij
and s′′ij ∼α t ′′ij . Also, for each i, j ′, we have ti
bij
T , again because si ∼α+1 ti . Thus, by
the definition of model, t c→T r(t, t ′′). Moreover, by the induction hypothesis, r(s, s′′) ∼α
r(t, t ′′), i.e. s ∼α r(t, t ′′). Thus r(t, t ′′) is the state t ′ we are looking for.
A similar argument establishes that fT (t1, . . . , tk)
c→T t ′ implies that there exists s′
with f (s1, . . . , sk)
c→S s′ and s′ ∼α t ′. 
Theorem 5.1.2 of [5] follows, as it is just the special case of the Proposition 3.4 in
which ∼α is the relation ∼ between the closed term model TR and itself. Also, it follows
that, for any closed process p and models S, T , we have pS ∼ pT , where pS (resp. pT ) is
the interpretation of p in S (resp. T ).
Next we review Hennessy–Milner logic [16]. We use A,B,C, . . . to range over formu-
las, which are given by the grammar:
A ::=  | ¬A | A ∧ B | 〈a〉A.
The other connectives and the [a] modality can be defined by:
⊥ = ¬ A ∨ B = ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B) [a]A = ¬〈a〉¬A.
Given a labelled transition system, T = (|T |, { a→T }), the satisfaction relation, T , relating
states of T and formulas, is defined as usual:3
t T  always holds
t T ¬A iff t  T A
t T A ∧ B iff t T A and t T B
t T 〈a〉A iff if there exists t ′ such that t a→T t ′ and t ′T A.
The modal depth, md(A), of a formula A is defined by:
md() = 0 md(A ∧ B) = max(md(A), md(B))
md(¬A) = md(A) md(〈a〉A) = 1 + md(A).
3 We use the symbol  rather than |=, because, for us, T is the model, rather than t . Moreover, the symbol |=
is already “overloaded” by other uses in Section 4.
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Proposition 3.5. If S, T are transition systems then, for any s ∈ S and t ∈ T , the follow-
ing are equivalent:
(1) s ∼m t.
(2) For all A with md(A)  m, it holds that sSA if and only if t T A.
Theorem 2.2 of [16] states a similar result, but the setting is slightly different. In [16], T is
required to be image finite, but Act is allowed to be infinite. The proof of the (1) ⇒ (2)
direction in [16] does not use the assumption of image finiteness, and thus establishes
this implication of Proposition 3.5. However, the proof in [16] of the (2) ⇒ (1) im-
plication does make essential use of image finiteness. Indeed, when Act is infinite, such
an assumption is necessary. Nevertheless, for finite Act, the (2) ⇒ (1) implication
holds without any restrictions on T , s and t . We include a proof of this at the end of the
section.
The final goal of this section is to establish various basic results about finite processes,
which will be required in Section 6. Define:
F0 = {∅} Fi+1 = P (Act × Fi) F =
⋃
i0
Fi.
Note that i  j implies Fi ⊆ Fj . Also, because Act is finite, each u ∈ F is a finite set.
Indeed, F is the smallest set such that F = Pfin(Act × F). We consider F as a transition
system, with the transition relation:
u
a→F u′ iff (a, u′) ∈ u.
We call the states in F the finite processes. If u ∈ Fi then u is a finite process of depth at
most i.
Proposition 3.6. For every transition system T and t ∈ T :
(1) There exists a unique utm ∈ Fm such that t ∼m utm.
(2) For every u ∈ Fmt, if t ∼m+1 u then t ∼ u.
Proof. We first prove statement 1 by induction on m. When m = 0, we have ∅ is the
unique element of F0 and trivially t ∼0 ∅. When m > 1, for each a ∈ Act and t ′ ∈ succa(t)
we have, by the induction hypothesis, a unique ut ′m−1 ∈ Fm−1 such that t ′ ∼m−1 utm−1.
Define
utm = {(a, ut
′
m−1) | a ∈ Act and t ′ ∈ succa(t)}.
It is easily verified that t ∼m utm. For uniqueness, consider any u ∈ Fm such that t ∼m u.
Whenever t a→T t ′, there exists u′ such that u a→F u′ and t ′ ∼m−1 u′. But then u′ = ut ′m−1,
by the uniqueness of ut ′m−1. Hence u
a→F ut ′m−1, i.e. (a, ut
′
m−1) ∈ u. This shows that utm ⊆
u. For the converse inclusion, suppose that (a, u′) ∈ u, i.e. u a→F u′. Then there exists t ′
such that t a→T t ′ and t ′ ∼m−1 u′. Again, by the uniqueness of ut ′m−1, we have u′ = ut
′
m−1.
Thus indeed (a, u′) ∈ utm, by the definition of utm. So u = utm, as required.
Statement 2 is also proved by induction on m. Observe that, for α > 0, we have ∅ ∼ t
if and only if t aT for all actions a ∈ Act if and only if ∅ ∼1 t . The m = 0 case is now
immediate as ∅ is the unique element of F0. For m > 0, take any u ∈ Fm, and suppose that
t ∼m+1 u. We show that t ∼ u. Suppose first that t a→T t ′. Then there exists u′ such that
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u
a→F u′ and t ′ ∼m u′. But u′ ∈ Fm−1. So, by the induction hypothesis, t ′ ∼ u′. Also, if
u
a→F u′ then there exists t a→T t ′ such that t ′ ∼m u′. Then u′ ∈ Fm−1. So, again by the
induction hypothesis, t ′ ∼ u′. Thus, by (3), indeed t ∼ u. 
An important property of finite processes is that each has a characteristic formula up to
∼m and ∼, in the sense of the proposition below. Statement (2) of the proposition is based
on [15, Theorem 1].
Proposition 3.7
(1) For all u ∈ Fm, there exists a formula χm(u) with md(χm(u))  m such that, for all
transition systems T and t ∈ T , it holds that t T χm(u) if and only t ∼m u.
(2) For all u ∈ F, there exists a formula χ(u) such that, for all transition systems T and
t ∈ T , it holds that t T χ(u) if and only t ∼ u.
Proof. Statement 1 is proved by induction on m. When m = 0, the only u ∈ F0 is u = ∅.
Define χ0(∅) = . Then t T χm(∅) always holds, as does t ∼0 ∅. Suppose m > 0, and
consider any u ∈ Fm. Define
χm(u) =
(∧
(a,u′)∈u 〈a〉χm−1(u
′)
) ∧ (∧
a∈Act [a]
(∨
u′∈{u′ |(a,u′)∈u} χm−1(u
′)
))
.
(N.b. an empty conjunction is  and an empty disjunction is ⊥.) We have md(χm(u))  m
because each md(χm−1(u′))  m − 1, by induction hypothesis.
To prove that t T χm(u) implies t ∼m u, assume that t T χm(u). Suppose t a→T t ′.
Then, because t T χm(u), it holds that t ′T
∨
u′∈{u′|(a,u′)∈u} χm−1(u′). So, for some u′
with (a, u′) ∈ u, we have t ′T χm−1(u′). Thus, by the induction hypothesis, t ′ ∼m−1
u′. Also u a→F u′ because (a, u′) ∈ u. Thus t a→T t ′ implies there indeed exists u′ with
u
a→F u′ and t ′ ∼m−1 u′. For the other implication in the definition of ∼m, suppose u a→F
u′, i.e. (a, u′) ∈ u. Then t T 〈a〉χm−1(u′). Thus there exists t ′ such that t a→T t ′ and
t ′T χm−1(u′). By the induction hypothesis t ′ ∼m−1 u′ as required. Thus indeed
t T χm(u) implies t ∼m u.
For the converse implication, assume that t ∼m u. We show that t T χm(u). To
establish that t T
∧
(a,u′)∈u 〈a〉χm−1(u′), consider any (a, u′) ∈ u. Then u a→F u′.
So, as t ∼m u, we have t a→T t ′ for some t ′ such that t ′ ∼m−1 u′. By the induction hypo-
thesis, t ′T χm−1(u). So t T 〈a〉χm−1(u′), as required. To establish that
t T
∧
a∈Act [a] (
∨
u′∈{u′|(a,u′)∈u} χm−1(u′)), consider any a ∈ Act and suppose that
t
a→T t ′. Because t ∼m u, we have u a→F u′ for some u′ with t ′ ∼m−1 u′. By the induc-
tion hypothesis, t ′T χm−1(u′). Also, (a, u′) ∈ u, so t ′T ∨u′∈{u′|(a,u′)∈u} χm−1(u′), as
required. This proves statement 1.
Statement 2 now follows easily. Consider any u ∈ F . Then there is a least m such that
u ∈ Fm. Define χ(u) = χm+1(u). We then have t t χ(u) iff t t χm+1(u) iff (by 1 above)
t ∼m+1 u iff (by Proposition 3.6(2)) t ∼ u. 
Having obtained the above results, we can now establish the (2) ⇒ (1) implication
of Proposition 3.5, as promised above.
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Proof of Proposition 3.5 (2) ⇒ (1). Suppose that sSA if and only if t T A, for all
A with md(A)  m. By Proposition 3.6(1), there exists a unique usm ∈ Fm such that s ∼m
usm. By Proposition 3.7(1), sSχm(usm). As md(χm(usm))  m, we have, by assumption,
that t FORT χm(usm). Thus, by Proposition 3.7(1), t ∼m usm. We have that s ∼m usm and
t ∼m usm. It follows, by Proposition 3.3, that s ∼m t , as required. 
4. The sequent calculus
In this section we present our applied sequent calculus. As motivated in Section 2, it has
different assertion forms: logical assertions p :A, and action assertions p a→q. In addition,
as the operational semantics allows negative premises, we include inaction assertions of the
form p a. We use J,K, . . . to range over assertions and ,, . . . to range over (possibly
infinite) sets of assertions.
Assertions have interpretations in arbitrary premodels. A relation T |=γ J between
premodels T , environments γ and assertions J is defined by:
T |=γ p a→q iff γ (p) a→T γ (q),
T |=γ p a iff γ (p) aT ,
T |=γ p :A iff γ (p)T A.
Observe that T |=γ p a if and only if T |=γ [a]⊥. Thus the inclusion of inaction as-
sertions is, expressivity wise, unnecessary. Nevertheless, we find it convenient to include
them, as it allows a clean separation between (in)action assertions, used in formalizing the
operational semantics, and logical assertions.
We write  |=T  to mean that, for all environments γ , if, for all J ∈ , it holds that
T |=γ J then there exists K ∈  such that T |=γ K . We write |=  to mean that |=T 
for all models T .
The sequent calculus uses sequents of the form  ⇒ , where  and  are finite,
which are to be read as expressing that  |= . As we saw in Section 2, there are problems
in obtaining a cut-free system for arbitrary sequents. We avoid these problems by defining
a proof system operating on a restricted class of sequents. This restricted class is obtained
by imposing conditions on the left-hand set of assertions.
Definition 4.1 (Assumable set). A (possibly infinite) set of assertions, , is said to be
assumable if it satisfies the following three conditions:
(A1) If p a→q ∈  then q is a process variable.
(A2) If p a→x ∈  and q b→x ∈  then p = q (syntactic identity) and a = b.
(A3) The relation,, on process variables, defined by x  y if there exists p a→y ∈ 
such that p contains x, is well-founded.
Note that any subset of an assumable set is itself assumable.
Definition 4.2 (Admissible sequent). We call a sequent  ⇒  admissible if  is assum-
able.
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Our sequent calculus will work with admissible sequents.
Conditions (A1)–(A3) above are the simplest we could find with which we could obtain
completeness and cut-elimination theorems. The three counterexamples from Section 2 are
ruled out by conditions (A1) and (A2). Condition (A3) prevents, for example, assertions
p
a→x from occurring in  when x ∈ Vars(p). For p containing arbitrary GSOS operators
(involving negative premises) it may be impossible to satisfy such assertions for reas-
ons to do with the nonexistence of solutions to arbitrary unguarded recursion equations.
As in Section 2, one can find examples of such assertions for which the sequent p a→
x ⇒ apparently requires cut to be derivable.
The conditions on assumability are also intuitively motivated in the following way. They
amount to being able to construct  from the empty set by (transfinitely) adding assertions
one at a time, subject to the restriction that, whenever an action assertion p a→x is added,
x neither occurs in p nor in any of the assertions already included. Thus, at the time of
adding p a→x, the variable x is unconstrained and represents an arbitrary process to which
p can evolve. There is an analogy here with the declaration of variables in dependent
type theories. Indeed, if one reads p a→q as an assertion that q has “type” p a→, then the
conditions on assumability are just an infinitary generalization of the usual dependency
requirements on contexts.
We now give the proof rules for the sequent calculus. In the rules we adopt standard
notational conventions, using comma for set union, omitting the empty set and omitting
delimiters from singleton sets. Each rule is to be read as applying only when the premises
and conclusion are all admissible sequents.
We present two proof systems: a basic proof system, and a full proof system. The rules
for the basic system are contained in Figs. 1–3. Additional rules for the full system are
listed in Fig. 4.
Fig. 1. Rules for logical assertions.
Fig. 2. Rules for inaction assertions.
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Fig. 3. Rules for action assertions.
Fig. 4. Additional rules for the full proof system.
The rules for logical assertions are presented in Fig. 1. These rules essentially form a
sequent calculus for a multi-modality version of the minimal modal logic K, albeit with
the extra baggage of process terms and (in)action assertions.
The rules for inaction assertions are presented in Fig. 2. They are a straightforward
implementation of the definition of a in terms of a→.
The rules for action assertions are presented in Fig. 3. The rationale behind them is that
the method of deriving an action assertion p c→q depends on the structure of p. If p is a
variable y, then the only applicable rule is the ( c→Ax) rule. This is just an instance of the
familiar identity axiom of sequent calculus. It is the only instance of the identity axiom
included in the basic proof system.
When p is of the form f (p1, . . . , pk), for some operator f , then the rules for deriving
p
c→q are determined by the GSOS system R. Suppose that R contains exactly lf c rules
with operator f and action c, so for each h with 1  h  lf c we have a distinct rule:
{
xi
ahij→ yij
}1ik
1jmhi
{
xi
bhij

}1ik
1jnhi
f (x1, . . . , xk)
c→rh(x, y)
(4)
Then we include lf c rules in the sequent calculus for introducing action assertions of
the form f (p1, . . . , pk)
c→r on the right of sequents, namely the rules (f c→R)1, . . . ,
(f c→R)lf c ; and we include one rule introducing such assertions on the left, namely the
rule (f c→L). Note that in any application of (f c→L), when lf c > 0, it must be the case
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that f (p1, . . . , pk)
c→x ∈ , as otherwise the premises would not be admissible. We give
examples of the rules generated by some specific process operators below.
Observe that the basic system contains none of the usual “structural rules” of sequent
calculus. The exchange and contraction rules are redundant because sequents are built from
finite sets. The full system is obtained from the basic system by extending it with the
rules of Fig. 4, all of which may be reasonably described as “structural rules”. These rules
include the standard weakening rules (WkL) and (WkR), and the standard axiom rule
(Ax). Note that, in these rules, admissibility considerations require that any action assertion
p
a→q, appearing as J on the left-hand side of a sequent, must be of the form p a→x. The
substitution and cut rules, (Sub) and (Cut), are as expected. However, for action assertions,
we also include a natural combination of the two, ( c→Cut), which allows one to cut out an
arbitrary action assertion from the right-hand side of a sequent in a way that is consistent
with admissibility requirements.
The ethos behind the separation of the basic and full proof systems is as follows.
Each rule in the basic system is associated to a single logical connective or operational
primitive. Moreover, the premises of the rule are obtained by decomposing a formula or
process term in a principled way depending on the associated primitive. Furthermore, each
rule embodies, as directly as possible, a basic logical property of its associated notion.
Thus the rules of the basic system directly implement structural and natural reasoning in
the sense of Section 1. On the other hand, the rules of the extended system implement
general properties of logical consequence, useful for modularizing proofs, and essential
for formalizing compositional verification methods.
Before stating our main results we give some illustrative examples of the induced rules
for particular process operators. For the prefix, zero and sum operators, the right-hand rules
are the same as those given earlier in Section 2. The left-hand rules differ in that they are
specifically tailored to admissible sequents. The new versions are (modulo trivial variable
renamings):
[p/x] ⇒ [p/x]
, a.p
a→x ⇒ 
a /= b
, a.p
b→x ⇒ 
, 0 a→x ⇒ 
, p
a→x ⇒  , q a→x ⇒ 
, p + q a→x ⇒ 
All the rules are special cases of their earlier counterparts. We remark that the renaming
and restriction operators of CCS can also be dealt with easily.
Parallel operators are more interesting. First, we consider the interleaving (non-com-
municating) parallel, p||q, whose operational rules are:
x
a→x′
x||y a→x′||y
y
a→y′
x||y a→x||y′
The derived sequent rules for || are therefore:
 ⇒ p a→p′, 
 ⇒ p||q a→p′||q, 
 ⇒ q a→q ′, 
 ⇒ p||q a→p||q ′, 
[x||q / z], p a→x ⇒ [x||q / z] [p||y / z], q a→y ⇒ [p||y / z]
, p||q a→z ⇒ 
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where in the last rule, the variables x and y must not appear in the concluding sequent. This
rule nicely illustrates the difference between structural and compositional proof methods.
The rule is manifestly structural, as the premises are obtained via syntactic decompositions
of the conclusion. In particular, the assertion p||q a→z in the conclusion is broken down
into assertions p a→x and q a→y in the premises. However, the rule is not compositional,
because each premise contains both the process terms p and q.
The communicating parallel p|q of CCS is slightly more complicated, due to the fact
that a silent τ action can be triggered by a synchronization on any non-τ action. Thus the
left-hand rule for p|q τ→z assertions is
1, p
τ→x ⇒ 1 2, q τ→y ⇒ 2 {3, p a→x, q a→y ⇒ 3}a∈Act\{τ }
, p|q τ→z ⇒ 
where: 1,1 are obtained from , using the substitution [x|q/z]; the sets 2,2 are
obtained using [p|y/z]; the sets 3,3 are obtained using [x|y/z]; and x, y do not appear
in the rule conclusion. Similar complexities in the handling of communicating parallel
were encountered by Stirling [25]. In our setting, a natural way of reducing the com-
plexity would be to include an algebra of action variables and terms (e.g. (·) should be
a unary operator on actions), together with a new assertion form stating equality between
action terms. However, to properly incorporate these features, similar such modifications
must also be made at the level of the GSOS rule specifications. In this paper, we con-
tent ourselves with dealing with ordinary GSOS specifications, based on a finite set of
actions.
None of the example operators above exploits the GSOS feature of allowing negat-
ive premises (inaction assertions) in operational rules. For an example involving inaction
assertions, the reader is referred to the original conference version of this paper [23].
To show the basic proof system at work, we give in Fig. 5 an example derivation of
the sequent x : 〈b〉, x : [a]〈b〉 ⇒ x||y : [a]〈b〉. For readability, we write [a] as a
primitive modality, using the proof rules (1) from Section 2. When [a] is defined in terms of
〈a〉, these proof rules are easily derived via a combination of the rules for 〈a〉 and negation.
We also avoid including extraneous assertions in the sequents in Fig. 5. The full derivation
involves evident weakenings of the written sequents.
We end this section with the main results. For assumable (possibly infinite)  and
arbitrary  we write  b  to mean that there exist finite subsets ′ ⊆  and ′ ⊆ 
such that the sequent ′ ⇒ ′ (which is admissible) is derivable in the basic proof
system. Similarly, we write  f  to mean that for some finite subsets ′ ⊆  and ′ ⊆ 
the sequent ′ ⇒ ′ is derivable in the full proof system. Trivially  b  implies
 f .
Theorem 1 (Soundness of the full proof system). If fthen |=.
Proof. We prove, by induction on derivations, that if  ⇒  is derivable in the full
proof system then  |= . We consider three illustrative cases involving action assertions.
Case 1. Suppose we have derived  ⇒ f (p1, . . . , pk) c→rh( p, q),  as a result of
an application of the (f c→R)h rule. Then, by the induction hypothesis, we have  |=
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Fig. 5. Example derivation of x : 〈b〉, x : [a]〈b〉 ⇒ x||y : [a]〈b〉.
pi
ahij→ qhij , , for all i, j with 1  i  k and 1  j  mhi ; and  |= pi bhij , , for all i, j
with 1  i  k and 1  j  nhi . We must show that  |= f (p1, . . . , pk) c→rh( p, q), .
Consider then any model T and environment γ such that, for all J ∈ , it holds that T |=γ
J and, for all K ∈ , it holds that T |=γ K . We must show that T |=γ f (p1, . . . , pk) c→
rh( p, q). By the induction hypothesis, T |=γ pi ahij→ qhij and T |=γ pi bhij , for all relevant
i, j ; i.e. γ (pi)
ahij→T γ (qij ) and γ (pi) bhij T . Thus, by Definition 3.1, we have γ (f (p1, . . . ,
pk))
c→T γ (rh( p, q)), i.e. T |=γ f (p1, . . . , pk) c→rh( p, q), as required.
Case 2. Suppose we have derived , f (p1, . . . , pk)
c→x ⇒ , as a result of an applic-
ation of the (f c→L) rule. Then, by the induction hypothesis, we have
[rh( p, y)/x],
{
pi
ahij→ yij
}1ik
1jmhi
,
{
pi
bhij

}1ik
1jnhi
|= [rh( p, y)/x],
for each h with 1  h  lf c. We must show that , f (p1, . . . , pk)
c→x |= . Consider
any model T and environment γ such that T |=γ f (p1, . . . , pk) c→x and, for all J ∈ ,
it holds that T |=γ J . We must show that T |=γ K for some K ∈ . As T |=γ f (p1, . . . ,
pk)
c→x, we have γ (f (p1, . . . , pk)) c→T γ (x). So, by Definition 3.1, there exists h with
1  h  lf c, and there exist {tij }1jni1ik such that: for all i, j with 1  i  k and 1  j 
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mi , it holds that γ (pi)
ahij→T tij ; for all i, j with 1  i  k and 1  j  ni , it holds that
γ (pi)
bhij
 T ; and γ (x) = r(γ ( p), t). Define γ ′ = γ [y 	→ t]. Then γ (x) = γ ′(rh( p, y)),
because none of the y variables occurs in p. Also, for every J ∈  ∪ , none of the y vari-
ables occurs in J , so T |=γ ′ J [rh( p, y)/x] if and only if T |=γ J . Therefore: for all J ∈ ,
it holds that T |=γ ′ J [rh( p, y)/x]; for all relevant i, j , it holds that T |=γ ′ pi
ahij→ yij ; and,
for all relevant i, j , it holds that T |=γ ′ pi bhij . Thus, by the induction hypothesis, there
exists K ∈  such that T |=γ ′ K[rh( p, y)/x]. So indeed T |=γ K .
Case 3. Suppose we have derived [q/x] ⇒ [q/x] as a result of an application of
the ( c→Cut) rule. Then, by the induction hypothesis, , p c→x |=  and [q/x] |= p c→q,
[q/x]. We must show that [q/x] |= [q/x]. Accordingly, consider any model T and
environment γ . Suppose, for contradiction that: for all J ∈ , it holds that T |=γ J [q/x];
and, for all K ∈ , it holds that T |=γ K[q/x]. Then, because [q/x] |= p c→q, [q/x],
we have T |=γ p c→q. Define γ ′ = γ [x 	→ γ (q)]. Then, for all J ∈ , it holds that T |=γ ′
J ; and, for all K ∈ , it holds that T |=γ ′ K . So, as, p c→x |= , we have T |=γ ′ p c→x.
But x ∈ Vars(p), because , p a→x is assumable, so γ ′(p) = γ (p). Therefore T |=γ p c→
q. This gives the desired contradiction.
Remaining cases. These are similar, and are left to the reader. 
Theorem 2 (Completeness of the basic proof system). If  is assumable and  |=  then
 b .
The proof of this theorem is given in Section 5.
We state two immediate corollaries of Theorems 1 and 2.
Corollary 1 (Equivalence of the basic and full systems).  b  if and only if  f .
Thus all the proof rules in Fig. 4 are admissible in the basic system, including, in
particular, the (Cut) and ( c→Cut) rules. It would be interesting to obtain a syntactic proof of
this fact. We have not carried out such a proof, but we have checked that the “local” proof
reductions all go through. Interestingly, these local reductions confirm the naturalness of
including the ( c→Cut) rule as primitive in conjunction with (Cut).
Corollary 2 (Compactness). If  |=  then there exist finite subsets ′ ⊆  and ′ ⊆ 
such that ′ |= ′.
5. Proof of completeness
This entire section is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 2. As usual we prove the con-
trapositive. Suppose that 0 b 0 where 0 is assumable, and where, for convenience in
the proof, we assume, without loss of generality, that there are infinitely many variables not
contained in Vars(0 ∪ 0). We shall construct a model Tc together with an environment
γc showing that 0 |= 0.
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To help construct the model, we define a sequence of 4-tuples (i ,i , σi,Di), for
i  0. In doing so, we ensure that i is assumable and that i b i . The sequence is
constructed by eventually breaking down all compound assertions in i (resp. i) into
components that witness their truth (resp. falsity) in the constructed model. This much
will be familiar to anyone who has previously seen a direct proof of completeness for a
cut-free sequent calculus or tableau system. In our case, there are added complications to
do with maintaining the assumability of i . To deal with this, we simultaneously build
substitution functions σi (see Section 3) recording the sequence of term substitutions made
when decomposing action assertions in the process of generating i and i from 0 and
0. We also record the domains Di ⊆ Vars on which these substitution functions are non-
trivial. The main technical difficulty is to show that the sequence of substitution functions
converges to a limiting substitution function, required to define the environment γc, see
Lemma 5.7.
In defining the sequence, we write Ui for the set
⋃
ji Vars(j ∪ j ), and Vi for Ui\Di .
We also write  for an empty vector (of process terms).
We already have 0 and 0. Define σ0 to be the identify function, and D0 = ∅.
To define the rest of the sequence we use a “scheduling” set. Let {τ0, τ1, . . . } be an
enumeration of all 3-tuples (J, q, m), where J is an assertion, q is a (possibly empty)
vector of process terms and m  0, so that each such 3-tuple appears infinitely often in the
enumeration. The purpose of these 3-tuples is to record, in a convenient (though somewhat
redundant) format, each possible way of decomposing a goal into new subgoals using
basic proof rules. The first component represents the assertion decomposed by a rule. The
second component is the sequence of term substitutions used in the decomposition. The
third component, if 0, signifies a left rule and, if  1, signifies a right rule, with the higher
numbers being used to enumerate the rules (f c→R)1, . . . , (f c→R)lf c . The precise way in
which all this information is used will be clarified by the construction below.
Define i+1 = i , i+1 = i , σi+1 = σi and Di+1 = Di , unless one of the following
conditions holds:
• τi = (p : ¬A, , 0) and p : ¬A ∈ i , in which case i+1 = i ∪ {p :A};
• τi = (p :A ∧ B, , 0) and p : A ∧ B ∈ i , in which case i+1 = i ∪ {p : A,
p :B};
• τi = (p : 〈a〉A, , 0) and p : 〈a〉A ∈ i , in which case i+1 = i ∪ {p a→x, x : A}
where x is a chosen variable not contained in Ui ;
• τi = (p a, q, 0), and p a ∈ i and also Vars(q) ⊆ Vi , in which case i+1 = i ∪
{p a→q};
• τi = (f (p1, . . . , pk) c→x, , 0) and f (p1, . . . , pk) c→x ∈ i , in which case:
i+1 = (i\{f (p1, . . . , pk) c→x})[rh( p, y)/x] ∪{
pi′
ahi′j→ yi′j
}1i′k
1jmhi′
∪
{
pi′
bhi′j

}1i′k
1jnhi′
i+1 = i[rh( p, y)/x]
σi+1 = z 	→ (σi(z))[rh( p, y)/x]
Di+1 = Di ∪ {x}.
where y is a chosen vector of distinct variables not contained in Ui and h is chosen with
1  h  lf c so that i+1 b i+1;
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• τi = (p : ¬A, , 1) and p : ¬A ∈ i , in which case i+1 = i ∪ {p :A};
• τi = (p :A ∧ B, , 1) and p :A ∧ B ∈ i , in which case i+1 = i ∪ {p :A} if i b
p :A, i , and i+1 = i ∪ {p :B} otherwise;
• τi = (p : 〈a〉A, q, 1) and p : 〈a〉A ∈ i and also Vars(q) ⊆ Vi , in which case if i b
q :A, i then i+1 = i ∪ {q :A}, otherwise i+1 = i ∪ {p a→q};
• τi = (p a, , 1) and p a ∈ i , in which case i+1 = i ∪ {p a→x} where x is a chosen
variable not contained in Ui ;
• τi = (f (p1, . . . , pk) c→rh( p, q), q, h), where 1  h  lf c, and Vars(q) ⊆ Vi , and
also f (p1, . . . , pk)
c→rh( p, q) ∈ i , in which case: if there exist i′, j with 1  i′  k
and 1  j  mhi′ such that i b pi′
ahi′j→ qi′j , i then i+1 = i ∪ {pi′
ahi′j→ qi′j } for a
chosen such i′, j ; otherwise i+1 = i ∪ {pi′
bhi′j
 } for a chosen i′, j with 1  i′  k
and 1  j  nhi′ such that i b pi′
bhi′j
 , i ;
where, in the action assertion cases, it is assumed that the rules in R with operator f
and action c have the form in (4) of Section 4, and that the vectors y and q have the
appropriate length. (Similar assumptions are made below without further comment.)
Curiously, in order to establish that the definition above is good, we first need a simple
proof-theoretic lemma.
Lemma 5.1. The weakening rules (WkL) and (WkR) are admissible in the basic proof
system.
Proof. A straightforward induction on the structure of derivations.
Lemma 5.2. The sequence (i ,i , σi,Di) is well defined, each i is assumable and
i b i .
Proof. We prove by induction on i that: (i ,i , σi,Di) is well defined; i is assumable;
i b i , and there are infinitely many variables not contained in Ui . The base case i = 0
is trivial. For i > 0, the result is also trivial if none of the τi−1 clauses applies. If one of the
τi−1 clauses does apply, then the proof splits into a case analysis, one for each clause. In
each case the argument is similar. We illustrate the general pattern, by considering the two
most interesting cases.
Case 1: τi = (f (p1, . . . , pk) c→x, , 0). We give the argument for this case in detail. For
each h with 1  h  lf c, define:
′h = (i−1\{f (p1, . . . , pk) c→x})[rh( p, y)/x] ∪{
pi′
ahij ′→ yi′j
}1i′k
1jmhi
∪
{
pi′
bhi′j

}1i′k
1jnhi′
′h = i−1[rh( p, y)/x]
selecting the yi′j from the infinitely many variables not contained in Ui−1. We show that
each ′h is assumable. Conditions (A1) and (A2) are immediate. For the well-foundedness
of the ′h relation, suppose, for contradiction, that · · ·′h z2 ′h z1 ′h z0 is a des-
cending sequence of variables. For any l  1, it holds that zl ∈ Vars(i−1)\{x} (note that
z0 may be one of the yi′j variables). For variables z, z′ ∈ Vars(i−1)\{x}, it holds that
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z′ ′h z iff: either z
′ i−1 z; or z′ i−1 x i−1 z. Thus, it holds that . . .
+
i−1 z3 
+
i−1
z2 
+
i−1 z1, contradicting the well-foundedness of i−1 . So 
′
h is indeed assumable.
Next, suppose, for contradiction, that ′h b ′h for each h. Then there exist finite
subsets ′′h ⊆ ′h and ′′h ⊆ ′h such that, each sequent ′′h ⇒ ′′h is derivable. Define
†i−1 = {J ∈ i−1 | for some h, J [rh( p, y)/x] ∈ ′′h}
†i−1 = {J ∈ i−1 | for some h, J [rh( p, y)/x] ∈ ′′h}
′′′h = †i−1[rh( p, y)/x] ∪
{
pi′
ahi′j→ yi′j
}1i′k
1jmhi
∪
{
pi′
bhi′j

}1i′k
1jnhi′
′′′h = †i−1[rh( p, y)/x].
Then †i−1 and 
†
i−1 are both finite sets (because, for any assertion K , there are only
finitely many assertions J that satisfy J [rh( p, y)/x] = K). Thus ′′′h and ′′′h are also
finite. Also †i−1, f (p1, . . . , pk)
c→x is assumable because it is a subset of i−1, and
′′′h is assumable because it is a subset of ′h. Moreover, ′′′h ⊇ ′′h and ′′′h ⊇ ′′h. So, each
sequent ′′′h ⇒ ′′′h is derivable, by the admissibility of weakening. However, together
these sequents form the premises for an application of the (f c→L) rule, with conclud-
ing sequent †i−1, f (p1, . . . , pk)
c→x ⇒ †i−1. Because †i−1, f (p1, . . . , pk)
c→x ⊆
i−1 and †i−1 ⊆ i−1, it follows that i−1 b i−1, which contradicts the induction
hypothesis.
We have shown that there exists h such that ′h b ′h. Thus (i ,i , σi,Di) is well-
defined with, for a chosen such h,
i = ′h σi = z 	→ (σi−1(z))[rh( p, y)/x]
i = ′h Di = Di−1 ∪ {x}.
We have already established that i is assumable, and we have ensured that i b i . Also
Ui = Ui−1 ∪ {yi′j }1ik1jmhi , so clearly there are infinitely many variables not in Ui . This
completes case 1.
Case 2: τi = (f (p1, . . . , pk) c→rh( p, q), q, h), where 1  h  lf c. We have
f (p1, . . . , pk)
c→rh( p, q) ∈ i−1 where Vars(q) ⊆ Vi−1. For each i′, j with 1  i′  k
and 1  j  mhi′ define:
′i′j = i−1 ′i′j = i−1, pi′
ahi′j→ qi′j .
Also, for each i′, j with 1  i′  k and 1  j  nhi′ define:
′′i′j = i−1 ′′i′j = i−1, pi′
bhi′j

By the induction hypothesis, each ′
i′j and 
′′
i′j is assumable.
Suppose, for contradiction, that ′
i′j b ′i′j and ′′i′j b ′′i′j , in every case. Then,
using the admissibility of weakening, as in the treatment of case 1 above, we have, by an
application of the (f c→R)h rule, that i−1 b i−1, contradicting the induction hypothesis.
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Thus: either ′
i′j b ′i′j for some i′, j with 1  i′  k and 1  j  mhi′ ; or ′′i′j b
′′i′j for some i′, j with 1  i′  k and 1  j  nhi′ . In the first case, (i ,i , σi,Di) is
well-defined with i = ′i′j and i = ′i′j for a chosen i′j such that ′i′j b ′i′j . If the
first case does not apply, then (i ,i , σi,Di) is well-defined with i = ′′i′j and i =
′′i′j for a chosen i′j such that 
′′
i′j b ′′i′j . In either case it holds that i is assumable
and i b i . Also, because Vars(q) ⊆ Vi−1, we have Ui = Ui−1. So, by the induction
hypothesis, there are indeed infinitely many variables not contained in Ui . This completes
the argument for case 2.
Remaining cases. These are similar, and are left to the reader. 
Lemma 5.3
(1) Di ⊆ Ui and Di ⊆ Di+1.
(2) z ∈ Di implies σi(z) = z.
(3) z ∈ Ui implies Vars(σi(z)) ⊆ Vi t.
(4) Vars(i ∪ i ) ⊆ Vi.
(5) If j  i then σj = σj ◦ σi.
(6) If j  i and J ∈ i then either σj (J ) ∈ j or J is p c→x with x ∈ Dj .
(7) If j  i and J ∈ i then σj (J ) ∈ j .
Proof. Statements (1)–(4) are proved by induction on i. We omit the easy arguments.
Statements (5)–(7) are proved by induction on j − i.
For (5), suppose j = i. If z ∈ Ui then σi(z) = z, by (1) and (2), so σi(σi(z)) = σi(z).
If z ∈ Ui then, by (3), Vars(σi(z)) ⊆ Vi = Ui\Di , so σi(σi(z)) = σi(z), by (2), because σi
is a term homomorphism. Thus indeed σi ◦ σi = σi .
If j − i > 0 then we have σj−1 ◦ σi = σj−1, by the induction hypothesis. In the case
that σj = σj−1, the result is immediate. Otherwise σj (z) = σj−1(z)[rh( p, y)/x] for some
term rh( p, y) and variable x. So:
σj (σi(z)) = σj−1(σi(z))[rh( p, y)/x] = σj−1(z)[rh( p, y)/x] = σj (z).
Thus indeed σj ◦ σi = σj .
For (6), suppose J ∈ i . By (4), Vars(J ) ⊆ Vi . Thus, by (2), σi(J ) = J . Thus the base
case, j = i, is trivial.
If j − i > 0 then, by the induction hypothesis, either σj−1(J ) ∈ j−1 or J is p a→z
with z ∈ Dj−1. In the latter case z ∈ Dj and we are done. In the former, we have σj−1(J ) ∈
j−1, and we may assume that J is not of the form p
a→z with z ∈ Dj−1. There are
now many subcases. If σj = σj−1 then, however j is constructed, we have j−1 ⊆ j .
So indeed σj (J ) ∈ j . Otherwise we have σj = z 	→ (σj−1(z))[rh( p, y)/x] and Dj =
Dj−1 ∪ {x}. There are now three possibilities. If J is of the form p a→x, then we have
x ∈ Dj as required. The second possibility is that J is p a→z for some z /= x. By the
earlier assumption, z ∈ Dj−1 hence σj−1(z) = z /= x. Thus σj−1(p) a→z ∈ j−1 and so
σj−1(p)[rh( p, y)/x] a→z ∈ j , i.e. indeed σj (J ) ∈ j . The third possibility is that J is
not an action assertion. In this case, we have immediately that σj−1(J )[rh( p, y)/x] ∈ j ,
i.e. σj (J ) ∈ j . This proves statement (6).
The proof of statement (7) is similar, but easier. 
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We now define the required model Tc. We write Dω for
⋃
i Di and Uω for
⋃
i Ui .
Define Vω = Uω\Dω. The model Tc is determined as the unique model such that: |Tc| =
{p | Vars(p) ⊆ Vω}; the operators are interpreted using the term algebra structure; and
x
a→TC q holds if and only if, for almost all j , it holds that x a→q ∈ j (in which case q
must be a process variable). The existence and uniqueness of Tc is guaranteed by Proposi-
tion 3.2.
To define the required environment γc takes some work. The crucial fact here is that the
sequence (σi) of substitution functions converges to a limiting substitution function, see
Lemma 5.7. In order to prove this, it is useful to assign ordinals < ωω to process terms.
Recall that any such ordinal has a unique normal form
ωl · nl + · · · + ω · n1 + n0, (5)
where l, nl, . . . , n0 are natural numbers with nl > 0 or l = 0. The order relation on such
ordinals is given by ωl.nl + · · · + ω · n1 + n0 > ωl′ .n′l′ + · · · + ω · n′1 + n′0 iff: either l >
l′; or l = l′ and nm > n′m where m  l is the greatest number such that nm /= n′m. We
recall some basic operations of ordinal arithmetic. For an ordinal α with normal form (5)
above, the ordinals α + 1, α + ω and ω · α, using the standard non-commutative ordinal
operations, have normal forms:
α + 1 = ωl · nl + · · · + ω · n1 + (n0 + 1)
α + ω = ωl · nl + · · · + ω · (n1 + 1) + 0
ω · α = ωl+1 · nl + · · · + ω2 · n1 + ω · n0 + 0.
To each term p we assign an ordinal |p|i < ωω, depending on the structure of i . The
assignment is defined by:
|x|i =
{
0 if there is no assertion p a→x in i
ω · |p|i if p a→x ∈ i
|f (p1, . . . , pk)|i = max(|p1|i , . . . , |pk|i ) + 1.
This is easily shown to be well-defined using the well-foundedness of i . In particular,
when defining |x|i in the case that p a→x ∈ i , we are given, by the induction hypothesis,
that |y|i is defined for all variables y occurring in p, hence |p|i is indeed defined.
Lemma 5.4. For any term p(x1, . . . , xk):
(1) |ql |i  |p(q1, . . . , qk)|i for each lXl ∈ Vars(p).
(2) |p(q1, . . . , qk)|i < max(|q1|i , . . . , |qk|i ) + ω.
(3) If |ql |i  |q ′l |j , for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k}, then |p(q1, . . . , qk)|i  |p(q ′1, . . . , q ′k)|j .
Proof. By easy inductions on the structure of p. 
The next lemma is the reason for the particular choice of ordinal assigment.
Lemma 5.5. If x ∈ Di+1\Di, with σi+1(x) = rh( p, y), then the following hold.
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(1) |rh( p, y)|i+1 < |x|i .
(2) If z ∈ Vi then |z[rh( p, y)/x]|i+1  |z|i .
Proof. If x ∈ Di+1\Di , with σi+1(x) = rh( p, y), then there is some assertion
f (p1, . . . , pk)
c→x in i . So
i+1 = (i\{f (p1, . . . , pk) c→x})[rh( p, y)/x] ∪{
pi′
ahi′j→ yi′j
}1i′k
1jmhi
∪
{
pi′
bhi′j

}1i′k
1jnh′
.
Define V = {z | z+i x}. By the well-foundedness of i , we have x ∈ V . We show that,
for any process term p with Vars(p) ⊆ V , it holds that |p|i+1 = |p|i . To see this, observe
that if z ∈ V and p a→z ∈ i then Vars(p) ⊆ V , so p a→z ∈ i+1. Conversely, suppose
that z ∈ V and p a→z ∈ i+1. Then z is not any of the yi′j , because these are not in Ui , so
not in V . Thus p must be p′[rh( p, y)/x] where p′ a→z ∈ i . But then Vars(p′) ⊆ V , so
p′ = p′[rh( p, y)/x] = p. Thus p a→z ∈ i . We have shown that if y ∈ V then p a→y ∈ i
if and only if p a→y ∈ i+1. It is now straightforward from the definitions of | · |i+1 and
| · |i that Vars(p) ⊆ V implies |p|i+1 = |p|i .
To prove statement (1), suppose that max(|p1|i , . . . , |pk|i ) has the normal form ωl ·
nl + · · · + ω · n1 + n0. Then
|x|i = ω · (max(|p1|i , . . . , |pk|i ) + 1)
= ωl+1 · nl + · · · + ω2 · n1 + ω · (n0 + 1) + 0.
By the fact shown above, we have |pi′ |i = |pi′ |i+1 for each i′ ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Thus, for each
yi′j , we have
|yi′j |i+1 = ω · |pi′ |i+1 = ω · |pi′ |i  ωl+1 · nl + · · · + ω2 · n1 + ω · n0 + 0.
Clearly, we also have
|pi′ |i+1 = |pi′ |i  ωl+1 · nl + · · · + ω2 · n1 + ω · n0 + 0.
So, by Lemma 5.4(2),
|rh( p, y)|i+1 < max
(
{|p1|i+1, . . . , |pk|i+1} ∪
{|yi′j ′ |i+1}1i′k1jmhi
)
+ ω
 (ωl+1 · nl + · · · + ω2 · n1 + ω · n0 + 0) + ω
= ωl+1 · nl + · · · + ω2 · n1 + ω · (n0 + 1) + 0
= |x|i .
Thus indeed |rh( p, y)|i+1 < |x|i .
Statement (2) is proved by induction over the well-founded relationi . There are three
possibilities for |z[rh( p, y)/x]|i+1.
In the first case, z = x, in which case |z[rh( p, y)/x]|i+1 = |rh( p, y)|i+1 < |x|i = |z|i ,
by statement (1).
In the second case, z /= x and z does not appear in any assertion q a→z in i+1. Then z
does not appear in any assertion q ′ a→z in i , for otherwise q ′[rh( p, y)/x] a→z would be
in i+1. Thus we have
|z[rh( p, y)/x]|i+1 = |z|i+1 = 0 = |z|i .
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In the third case, z /= x and z does appear in some assertion q a→z in i+1. As z ∈ Vi ,
it is not equal to any of the yi′j , so there must be an assertion q ′
a→z ∈ i with q =
q ′[rh( p, y)/x]. For each z′ ∈ Vars(q ′), we have z′ i z, so, by the induction hypothesis,
|z′[rh( p, y)/x]|i+1  |z′|i . Then, by Lemma 5.4(3), we have |q ′[rh( p, y)/x]|i+1  |q ′|i ,
i.e. |q|i+1  |q ′|i . But then
|z[rh( p, y)/x]|i+1 = ω · |q|i+1  ω · |q ′|i = |z|i .
Thus, in all three cases, |z[rh( p, y)/x]|i+1  |z|i . 
Lemma 5.6. If x ∈ Vi and i  j then |σj (x)|j  |x|i .
Proof. By induction on j − i. When j = i, by Lemma 5.3(2), σj (x) = x. If j − i > 0
then, by the induction hypothesis, |σj−1(x)|j−1  |x|i .
If σj = σj−1, then it is easily checked that each possible case for the definition of j
has the property that |z|j = |z|j−1 for all z ∈ Vj−1. Thus, by Lemma 5.4(3), for all p with
Vars(p) ⊆ Vj−1, we have |p|j = |p|j−1. So |σj (x)|j = |σj−1(x)|j = |σj−1(x)|j−1  |x|i .
Alternatively, there exists z ∈ Dj\Dj−1, with σj (x) = σj−1(x)[rh( p, y)/z] By
Lemma 5.5(2), we have, for each z′ ∈ Vars(σj−1(x)) that |z′[rh( p, y)/z]|j  |z′|j−1.
So, by Lemma 5.4(3), |σj−1(x)[rh( p, y)/z]|j  |σj−1(x)|j−1. Therefore |σj (x)|j =
|σj−1(x)[rh( p, y)/z]|j  |σj−1(x)|j−1  |x|i .
Thus indeed |σj (x)|j  |x|i . 
Lemma 5.7. For every variable x, there exists j such that σj ′(x) = σj (x) for all j ′  j.
Proof. For x ∈ Uω, the statement is trivial. Otherwise we prove: for all ordinals α < ωω,
and all x ∈ Uω, if there exists i with x ∈ Vars(i ∪ i ) and |x|i = α then there exists jx
such that σj ′(x) = σjx (x) for all j ′  jx . The proof is by transfinite induction on α.
Suppose that x ∈ Vars(i ∪ i ) and |x|i = α. There are two cases.
If x ∈ Dj for all j , then the result is trivial, as σj (x) = x for all j .
Otherwise, x ∈ Dj+1\Dj for some j . Moreover, j  i because, by Lemma 5.3(4),
for j ′ > j , we have x ∈ Vars(′j ∪ j ′). By, Lemma 5.6, we have |x|j  |x|i = α. Also,
σj+1(x) = rh( p, y). By, Lemmas 5.4(1) and 5.5(1), for all z ∈ Vars(rh( p, y)), we have
|z|j+1  |rh( p, y)|j+1 < |x|j  α. So, by the induction hypothesis, for each such variable
z, there exists jz such that σj ′(z) = σjz(z) for all j ′  jz. There are only finitely many
variables z1, . . . , zm in Vars(rh( p, y)). Define jx = max(jz1 , . . . , jzm, j + 1). Take any
j ′  jx . We must show that σj ′(x) = σjx (x).
For all variables z ∈ Vars(rh( p, y)), it holds that σj ′(z) = σjx (z). So, as σj ′ and σjx are
homomorphisms, σj ′(rh( p, y)) = σjx (rh( p, y)). Moreover, because j ′  j + 1, we have
σj ′ = σj ′ ◦ σj+1, by Lemma 5.3(5). Thus indeed:
σj ′(x) = σj ′(σj+1(x)) = σj ′(rh( p, y))
= σjx (rh( p, y)) = σjx (σj+1(x)) = σjx (x). 
Lemma 5.7 allows us to define the limiting substitution function, σω, by:
σω(x) = the unique p such that σi(x) = p for almost all i.
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Lemma 5.8
(1) z ∈ Dω implies σω(z) = z.
(2) z ∈ Uω implies Vars(σω(z)) ⊆ Vω.
(3) σω = σω ◦ σi.
(4) If J ∈ i then either σω(J ) ∈ j for almost all j, or J is p a→x with x ∈ Dω.
(5) If J ∈ i then σω(J ) ∈ j for almost all j.
Proof. All statements follow easily from the definition of σω, using the analogous state-
ments for the various σi in Lemma 5.3. 
We can now finally define the required environment. Define γc(x) to be σω(x) if x ∈
Uω and an arbitrary element of |Tc| otherwise. This is indeed an environment for Tc, by
Lemma 5.8(2) above.
Lemma 5.9
(1) J ∈ i implies Tc |=γc J.
(2) J ∈ i implies Tc |=γc J.
Proof. First the lemma is proved for assertions p c→q and p c, by induction on the
structure of σω(p).
Case 1: p c→x ∈ i . If x ∈ Dω then, by Lemma 5.8(1&4), it holds that σω(p) c→x ∈ j
for almost all j  i. But then σω(p) must be a variable y, as otherwise for some τj of
the form (σω(p)
c→x, , 0) we would have x ∈ Dj+1, a contradiction. So y c→Tc x, by the
definition of Tc. Thus indeed Tc |=γc p c→x.
Otherwise, if x ∈ Dω then for some j  i, we have x ∈ Dj+1\Dj . Thus, by
Lemma 5.3(6), σj (p) c→x ∈ j and τj = (σj (p) c→x, , 0) where σj (p) has the form
f (p1, . . . , pk). So, for some h, we have
{
pi′
ahi′j→ yi′j
}1i′k
1jmhi′
∪
{
pi′
bhi′j

}1i′k
1jnhi′
⊆ j+1.
By Lemma 5.8(3), σω(p) = σω(σj (p)) = f (σω(p1), . . . , σω(pk)). So, by the induction
hypothesis, Tc |=γc pi′
ahi′j→ yi′j and Tc |=γc pi′
bhi′j
 , for all appropriate i′, j . Then, as Tc
is a model of R, we have Tc |=γc f (p1, . . . , pk) c→rh( p, y). By Lemma 5.8(3), γc(x) =
σω(x) = σω(σj+1(x)) = σω(rh( p, y)). Thus indeed Tc |=γc p c→x.
Case 2: p c→r ∈ i . By Lemma 5.8(5), σω(p) c→σω(r) ∈ j for almost all j . Suppose,
for contradiction, that Tc |=γc p c→r , i.e. that σω(p) c→Tc σω(r).
If σω(p) is a variable x then x
c→Tc σω(r), so, by the definition of Tc, we have that
σω(r) is a variable y and x
c→y ∈ j for almost all j . But, for almost all j , we also have
x
c→y ∈ j . Thus, by the ( c→Ax) rule, j b j for almost all j , a contradiction.
If σω(p) = f (p1, . . . , pk) then f (p1, . . . , pk) c→Tc σω(r). So there exist h and q, with
Vars(q) ⊆ Vω, such that σω(r) = rh( p, q) and:
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(1) for all i′, j ′ with 1  i′  k and 1  j ′  mhi′ , pi′
ahi′j ′→ Tc qi′j ′ ; and
(2) for all i′, j ′ with 1  i′  k and 1  j ′  nhi′ , pi′
bhi′j ′
 Tc .
Now σω(p)
c→σω(r) ∈ j and Vars(q) ⊆ Vj , for almost all j . So for some τj = (σω(p) c→
σω(r), q, h) it holds that either pi′
ahi′j ′→ qi′j ′ ∈ j+1 or pi′
bhi′j ′
 ∈ j+1 for some suitable
i′, j ′. Then, by the induction hypothesis, either Tc |=γc pi′
ahi′j ′→ qi′j ′ or Tc |=γc pi′
bhi′j ′
 .
Thus either way contradicts 1 or 2 above.
We have shown that Tc |=γc p c→r , whatever the structure of σω(p). This completes
case 2.
Remaining cases. There are two more cases: one for assertions p c∈ i and one for
assertions p c∈ i . These are proved using similar, though easier, arguments to the above.
Having now established the lemma for action and inaction assertions, it remains to deal
with logic assertions p :A. For such assertions, the proof is by induction on the structure
of A.
Case 1: p : 〈a〉A ∈ i . For almost all j we have σω(p) : 〈a〉A ∈ j . Thus for some τj =
(σω(p) : 〈a〉A, , 0) we have {σω(p) a→x, x : A} ⊆ j+1. Then Tc |=γc σω(p) a→x and
Tc |=γc x :A, the latter by the induction hypothesis. So Tc |=γc p : 〈a〉A.
Case 2: p : 〈a〉A ∈ i . For almost all j we have σω(p) : 〈a〉A ∈ j . Suppose, for contradic-
tion, that Tc |=γc p : 〈a〉A. Thus there exists q with Vars(q) ⊆ Vω, such that σω(p) a→Tc q
and Tc |=γc q : A. For almost all j , Vars(q) ⊆ Vj . Thus for some τj of the form
(σω(p) : 〈a〉A, q, 1) we have that either q : A ∈ j+1 or σω(p) a→q ∈ j+1. In the first
case, by the induction hypothesis, Tc |=γc q : A. In the second case Tc |=γc σω(p) a→q,
i.e. σω(p)  a→Tc q. Either alternative contradicts the selection of q. Thus indeed Tc |=γc
p : 〈a〉A.
Remaining cases. The cases for the propositional connectives are straightforward, and thus
omitted. 
It follows immediately from the lemma above that 0 |= 0. This completes the proof of
Theorem 2.
6. The intended model and ω-completeness
The completeness theorem is relative to entailment over the class of all models of R.
Usually one is interested in truth in the intended model TR, defined after Proposition 3.2.
In this section we give conditions under which useful forms of completeness do indeed
hold relative to TR.
The first such completeness theorem is motivated by the fact, remarked upon after
Proposition 3.4, that, in any model, the state interpreting a closed process p is bisimilar
to the state p in TR. As we shall see, the proof system is complete for deriving the truth in
TR of sequents containing only closed process terms. Actually, a stronger result holds. It
is enough that every process variable in a sequent is forced to represent a state interpreting
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a closed process. A simple syntactic condition guarantees that this is the case. We say
that a pair of sets of assertions, (,), is closed generated if  is assumable and also
every variable x ∈ Vars( ∪ ) appears in an assertion of the form p a→x ∈ . This con-
dition ensures that each minimal variable x under  appears in an assertion of the form
p
a→x ∈  where p is closed, and thus, by the well-foundedness of , each variable is a
descendent of a closed process term.
Theorem 3. If (,) is closed generated and  |=TR  then   .
Here, in view of Corollary 1, we write    to mean  b  or  f .
Proof. Suppose that (0,0) is closed-generated and 0  0. Let Tc be the model
constructed in the proof of Theorem 2. By Lemma 5.9, we have 0 |=Tc 0. We use the
construction of Tc from Section 5 to show that Tc = TR.
First, observe that, by a straightforward induction on i, each (i ,i ) is closed-generated.
One then proves easily, by well-founded induction oni that, for each x ∈ Vars(i ∪ i ),
it holds that |x|i > 0, where |x|i is the ordinal assigned in Section 5.
Next, we show that x ∈ Uω implies that σω(x) is closed. Suppose for contradiction that
there exists some x ∈ Uω such that Vars(σω(x)) /= ∅. Using the ordinal assigment, select
x and i with |x|i minimal such that x ∈ Vars(i ∪ ) and Vars(σω(x)) /= ∅. As (i ,i ) is
closed-generated, there is some assertion q c→x ∈ i . By Lemma 5.8(4): either (i) x ∈ Dω;
or (ii) σω(q) c→x ∈ j for almost all j .
In case (i), there exists j  i such that x ∈ Dj+1\Dj , where σj (q) c→x ∈ i and σj+1 =
z 	→ (σj (z))[rh( p, y)/x]. By Lemmas 5.4(1), 5.5(1), and 5.6, for each z ∈ Vars(rh( p, y)),
we have
|z|j+1  |rh( p, y)|j+1 < |x|j = |σj (x)|j  |x|i .
By the minimality assumption on |x|i , for each such z, it holds that σω(z) is closed. Thus
σω(rh( p, y)) is closed. By Lemma 5.8(3), we have
σω(x) = σω(σj+1(x)) = σω(rh( p, y)).
Thus σω(x) is closed, contradicting the choice of x.
In case (ii), σω(q) c→x ∈ j for almost all j , and x ∈ Dω. Then σω(q) must be a vari-
able y, as otherwise for some τj of the form (σω(p)
c→x, , 0) we would have x ∈ Dj+1,
a contradiction. Therefore q is itself a variable z, with σω(z) = y. But then, by the defin-
ition of the ordinal assignment, |x|i = ω · |z|i > |z|i , with the latter inequality because
0 < |z|i < ωω. Thus, by the minimality assumption on |x|i , we have σω(z) is closed,
contradicting σω(z) = y.
We have proved that, for every x ∈ Uω, it holds that Vars(σω(x)) is closed. Therefore,
by Lemma 5.8(1), Uω = Dω. Thus Vω = ∅. So |Tc| is the set of closed processes. By
Proposition 3.2, it follows that Tc = TR. Thus indeed 0 |=TR 0. 
Given Theorems 1 and 2, an equivalent statement to Theorem 3 is that, when (,)
is closed-generated, then  |=TR  implies  |= . It is interesting to note that conditions
(A1) and (A2) on the assumability of  are essential for this implication to hold. For
example, we have that a.0 a→0 + 0 |=TR but not that a.0 a→0 + 0 |=, because 0 and 0 + 0
have the same denotation in the model obtained by quotienting TR by bisimilarity.
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The restriction to closed generated consequences does not fully exploit the expressivity
of sequents containing open terms. One would also like a completeness result for sequents
in which the variables need not derive from closed processes. Indeed such sequents are used
crucially to express the parametrized verification goals discussed in Section 1. What we
seek is a form of ω-completeness, i.e. completeness relative to all environments interpreting
process variables as closed processes in TR. In order to obtain such a result, it is necessary
to make some very mild expressivity assumptions on the GSOS system R. Recall the
definition of the transition system F of finite processes from Section 3.
Definition 6.1. We say that R represents every finite process if, for every u ∈ F there
exists p ∈ TR such that u ∼ p.
To motivate this definition, let us consider what happens when R does not represent
every finite process. Accordingly, suppose that there exists some finite process u ∈ F for
which there is no p ∈ TR with u ∼ p. Let χ(u) be the characteristic formula of u, given
by Proposition 3.7(2). Then we have |=TR x : ¬(χ(u)). However, clearly  x : ¬(χ(u))
because one can find models in which states bisimilar to u do exist. Thus ω-completeness
fails. Therefore, a necessary condition for ω-completeness, for even the simplest non-
closed-generated sequents, is that R represents every finite process. Surprisingly, this
turns out to be a sufficient condition for ω-completeness to hold for a very wide class
of sequents.
Theorem 4 (ω-completeness). Suppose that R represents every finite process. Then, for
finite ,  such that  is assumable and  contains no action assertions,  |=TR  implies
  .
The condition that R represents every finite process is rather mild. For example, it is
satisfied by any process algebra containing prefix, zero and sum.4
The restrictions on  and  in Theorem 4 are necessary. The finiteness condition is
required because the consequence relation  is compact, whereas |=TR need not be. For
example, take R to be the GSOS system containing just the prefix, zero and sum operat-
ors. Then it holds that |=TR {x : [a]n⊥ | n  0}, but it is clear that  {x : [a]n⊥ | n  0},
because one can find models containing processes able to perform infinite sequences of a
transitions. For an example showing why  is required to contain no action assertion, ob-
serve that it possible to construct a GSOS system, containing the prefix and zero operators,
that represents every finite process and in which the only closed process term bisimilar to
the zero process is 0 itself (so there is necessarily no sum operator). If R is such a system
then {x : [a]⊥ | a ∈ Act} |=TR a · 0 a→x, but the corresponding sequent is not provable,
because one can find models in which there are two distinct states bisimilar to 0. Note that
this type of counterexample does not work for those GSOS systems in which every finite
process is represented by an infinite number of distinct closed terms (such as any system
with prefix, zero and sum). It seems possible that, for such systems, ω-completeness might
hold for arbitrary finite .
Theorem 4 is proved by establishing that, under the conditions of the theorem,  |= 
implies  |=TR . Suppose then that R represents every finite process and that we have T
4 These operators are assumed present in the definition of GSOS system in [5].
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and γ such that, for all J ∈ , T |=γ J and, for all K ∈ , T |=γ K . We must define a
TR-environment γ ′ such that, for all J ∈ , TR |=γ ′ J and, for all K ∈ , TR |=γ ′ K .
We shall define γ ′ so that, for each x, it holds that γ ′(x) ∼m γ (x) for some m depending
on x, using the m-th approximation to bisimilarity from Section 3. To determine m we
assign a depth, d(p), to each process term p by:
d(x) =
{
d(p) + 1 if p a→x ∈ ,
0 otherwise,
d(f (p1, . . . , pk)) = max{d(p1), . . . , d(pk)}.
It follows from the well-foundedness of  that d(p) is well-defined. Define
n = max({d(p) + 1 | p a→x ∈  or p a∈  ∪ } ∪
{d(p) + md(A) | p :A ∈  ∪ }),
using the finiteness of  and . By a trivial induction on the structure of terms, one sees
that, for any term p, it holds that n  d(p).
Lemma 6.2. There exists a TR-environment γ ′ such that:
(1) γ ′(p) ∼n−d(p) γ (p), and
(2) p a→y ∈  implies γ ′(p) a→TR γ ′(y).
Proof. For each m ∈ {0, . . . , n}, we define γ ′(x) on variables x with d(x) = m, assuming
it already defined on variables y with d(y) < m. Moreover, we ensure that: (i) property
(1) holds for all p with Vars(p) ⊆ {y | d(y)  m}; and (ii) property (2) holds whenever
d(y)  m. Accordingly, let x be any variable with d(x) = m.
When m = 0, by Proposition 3.6(1), there exists a finite process u ∈ Fn such that
γ (x) ∼n u. BecauseR represents every finite process, there exists q ∈ TR such that q ∼ u.
By Proposition 3.3, it follows that q ∼n γ (x). Define γ ′(x) = q. We thus have
γ ′(x) ∼n−d(x) γ (x). Also note that there is no assertion p a→x ∈  because d(x) = 0.
When m > 0, we use as induction hypothesis that (i) holds when m is replaced by
m − 1. As d(x) > 0, we have p a→x ∈  for some p. So γ (p) a→T γ (x). But d(p) =
d(x) − 1 so, for all y ∈ Vars(p), we have d(y) < m. Thus, by the induction hypothesis,
γ ′(p) ∼n−(d(x)−1) γ (p), i.e. γ ′(p) ∼(n−d(x))+1 γ (p). As γ (p) a→T γ (x), there exists q ∈
|TR| such that γ ′(p) a→TR q and q ∼n−d(x) γ (x). Define γ ′(x) = q. Thus we have
γ ′(x) ∼n−d(x) γ (x) and γ ′(p) a→TR γ ′(x).
We now have γ ′ defined on all variables x with d(x)  m. We must show that (i) and
(ii) hold. By the definition of γ ′(x) above, we have ensured that γ ′(x) ∼n−d(x) γ (x) and
also that p a→x ∈  implies γ ′(p) a→TR γ ′(x). It remains to show that γ ′(p) ∼n−d(p)
γ (p) for any p with Vars(p) ⊆ {x | d(x)  m}. Consider any such p. Then, for each
x ∈ Vars(p) we have γ ′(x) ∼n−d(x) γ (x). But d(x)  d(p) so also γ ′(x) ∼n−d(p) γ (x).
Thus, by Proposition 3.4, indeed γ ′(p) ∼n−d(p) γ (p). 
Lemma 6.3. For all J ∈ , TR |=γ ′ J and, for all K ∈ , TR |=γ ′ K.
Proof. We consider the various cases in turn.
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If p a→x ∈  then, by Lemma 6.2(2), γ ′(p) a→TR γ ′(x), i.e. TR |=γ ′ p a→x.
If p a∈  then T |=γ p a, i.e. γ (p) aT . By Lemma 6.2(1), γ ′(p) ∼n−d(p) γ (p). By
the definition of n, we have n − d(p)  1. Thus, γ ′(p) ∼1 γ (p). It follows that γ ′(p) aTR ,
i.e. TR |=γ ′ p a.
If p : A ∈  then T |=γ p : A, i.e. γ (p)T A. Therefore, by Lemma 6.2(1), γ ′(p)
∼n−d(p) γ (p). By the definition of n, we have n − d(p)  md(A). Thus, γ ′(p) ∼md(A)
γ (p). So, by Proposition 3.5, γ ′(p)TRA, i.e. TR |=γ ′ p :A.
The cases for inaction and logic assertions in  are similar to the corresponding cases
for  above. 
Lemma 6.3 states that  |=TR . This completes the proof of Theorem 4.
As far as we are aware, there is no precursor to Theorem 4 in the literature. The closest
work is that of Stirling, who, in his proof system for CCS [25], used special sequents
A,B  C for stating parametrized goals of the form x :A, y :B ⇒ x|y :C. Using such
sequents, Stirling obtained completeness for ordinary verification goals p : A. However,
he did not obtain the completeness of his proof system for the sequents A,B  C. In our
approach, sequents expressing parametrized goals arise in a uniform way and are available
for all process operators in the language. Moreover, Theorem 4 shows that our proof system
is complete for establishing all such sequents.
7. Conclusions
Previous work on compositional proof systems for process algebras (see, e.g., [2,25,30])
has often involved ingenious ideas that work for the operators under consideration. In this
paper we have shown how such proof systems may be derived in a uniform way for any
GSOS system. Our use of GSOS systems may be seen as analogous to that of [1], where it
is shown how to derive complete equational axiomatizations of bisimilarity from arbitrary
GSOS rule specifications. In this paper, we have pursued a similar programme for modal
properties rather than equations.
Crucial to our approach is the use of a sufficiently expressive form of sequent, per-
mitting the incorporation of operational semantics into the proof rules. In addition to the
general completeness and cut-elimination theorems, a particularly important improvement
on previous work has been the proof of an ω-completeness theorem for a wide class of
sequents, including those expressing parametrized verification goals.
Regarding possible improvements to our work, there are several limitations inherent
in the use of GSOS systems. One is the restriction to a finite set of actions. There are
straightforward generalizations to infinite action sets which, however, involve the use of
infinitary rules. It would be interesting to develop a natural class of finitary rules for dealing
with infinite action sets, perhaps by using proof rules based on an algebra of action terms. A
further limitation is that we have not included a recursion operator in the GSOS system. As
remarked in [5], any process defined by guarded recursion can be incorporated by including
a new process constant for the process and giving it explicit operational rules. However, it
would be better to include direct proof rules for guarded recursion in the sequent calculus.
Although the definition of such an extension of our proof system is not difficult, it seems
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a nontrivial task to extend our proof of completeness to cover it, although in principle it
should be possible to do so.
A severe practical limitation of our work is the use of Hennessy–Milner logic, which
is too weak to express interesting temporal properties of programs. Since the research in
this paper was first carried out, there has been significant progress on the extension of the
methods in this paper to richer logics, such as Kozen’s modal µ-calculus [17]. This work
is surveyed in Section 8.
More generally, the idea of deriving Gentzen-style rules from operational semantics is
by no means restricted to GSOS-specified process algebras. Indeed, since the research
in this paper was first carried out, there have been several applications to richer pro-
cess languages and other programming paradigms. Once again, these are surveyed in
Section 8.
8. Epilogue
The research in this paper was first presented at the 1995 IEEE Logic in Computer Sci-
ence conference, under the title: “Compositionality via cut-elimination: Hennessy–Milner
logic for an arbitrary GSOS” [23]. The choice of title was unfortunate, as the slogan
“compositionality via cut-elimination” is misleading. At the time of the original confer-
ence submission (December 1994), I was failing to distinguish between compositional and
structural reasoning, and the original title was based on a conflation of the two. By the time
of the LICS conference (June 1995), I had realised my mistake, and I publicly retracted
the title during my talk. But that was too late for the proceedings version! The introduction
to the present paper presents what I believe is a correct account of compositional and
structural reasoning and their relationship to sequent calculus. Thus, in spite of the title
of [23], the cut rule is essential for compositional verification.
Instead, the significance of the admissibility of cut is twofold. First, it demonstrates
that the left and right rules for process operators properly complement each other, and so
justifies the formulation of these rules. Second, it shows that structural reasoning alone
suffices to establish any goal. It is unclear, however, whether or not the admissibility of cut
can (or even should) be maintained in extensions of the proof system to richer logics and
programming languages (for example, the extensions discussed below). Indeed, even if cut
is not admissible in such systems, its admissibility in the system of this paper still amounts
to justification of the formulation of the rules. Of course, structural reasoning is then no
longer sufficient on its own. But this is rather a fact of life than a problem. As discussed
in Section 1, one anyway expects to use a combination of reasoning methods in program
verification.
The other main contributions of the original paper were:
(1) The notion of GSOS model.
(2) The use of sequent calculus as a formalism for process verification.
(3) The derivation of proof rules from operational semantics.
(4) The completeness and ω-completeness results.
We end by discussing these within the context of subsequent developments.
In [23], the notion of GSOS model was used purely as a technical tool, needed to
establish a general completeness result (Theorem 2 of the present paper). Nevertheless, it
seemed a natural notion. This was later substantiated by Turi and Plotkin in their category-
theoretic account of the operational and denotational semantics of GSOS systems [27,28].
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In their work, a GSOS system gives rise to a monad on the category of transition systems
with functional bisimulations as morphisms. The algebras of this monad turn out to be
exactly the GSOS models in the sense of Definition 3.1.
The idea of using sequent calculus for process verification was proposed independently
by Dam [7], written at the same time as [23]. Dam was also concerned with obtaining com-
positional proof systems allowing natural forms of reasoning. However, in contrast to [23],
Dam used the much more expressive modal µ-calculus of Kozen [17], and concentrated
on soundness results (which are nontrivial in that setting) rather than completeness results
(which are unachievable for the µ-calculus, see below).
There are two alternative approaches to extending the approach of this paper to the
modal µ-calculus. The most obvious is to include induction and coinduction rules for least
and greatest fixed points respectively. For example, natural proof rules for the greatest-
fixed-point operator are given by:
, p :A[νX.A/X] ⇒ 
, p : νX.A ⇒ 
, x :B ⇒ x :A[B/X],   ⇒ p :B, 
 ⇒ p : νX.A, 
where, in the right-hand rule, x must not appear in the rule conclusion. The right-hand
rule is a coinduction rule, based on using a formula B, representing a post-fixed point for
the operator X 	→ A, as a coinduction hypothesis. Dual rules are applicable to least fixed
points.
Unfortunately, such rules on their own appear too weak to establish any interesting
properties of processes. The problem is that the induction and coinduction hypotheses re-
quired in practice, which often involve syntactic closure conditions on classes of processes,
are not expressible in the modal µ-calculus. In his MSc dissertation [4], Beattie showed
that by moving to a first-order µ-calculus, including processes as terms, such induction and
coinduction rules can be used to prove interesting properties, including useful parametrized
verification goals. However, there are two drawbacks to this approach. First, the proofs
using induction and coinduction turn out to be long and awkward. Second, moving to a
first-order logic with process terms amounts to a paradigm shift from an endogenous logic
to an exogenous logic, in the sense of Pnueli [19]. In endogenous logics, such as Hennessy–
Milner logic and the modal µ-calculus, the language of properties (logical formulas) is
independent of the language of programs (process terms). One would like proof systems
for such logics to maintain this desirable separation.
The second approach to including fixed-points in the logics is to adopt a tableau-based
approach to derivations, influenced by local model checking [26]. Under this approach,
one simply includes unfolding rules for fixed points, e.g.
, p :A[νX.A/X] ⇒ 
, p : νX.A ⇒ 
 ⇒ p :A[νX.A/X], 
 ⇒ p : νX.A, 
The power of the method is achieved by identifying global combinatorial discharge con-
ditions on derivation trees, involving repetitions of sequents, that suffice for the conclud-
ing sequent of a derivation to be valid. Such conditions do not require every leaf of the
derivation tree to be an axiom.
The adaptation of such tableau-based techniques to sequent calculus including cut (re-
quired for compositionality) is nontrivial. Addressing this problem has been a main con-
cern of Dam [7,8,11]. In [11], Dam and Gurov suggest extending the modal µ-calculus
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with primitives for explicit approximants of fixed points, implemented by adding ordinal
variables to the syntax. This approach has led to an elegant characterization of sound
discharge conditions in terms of Büchi automata over derivation trees [24]. In related
work, Schöpp and I have shown that explicit approximants can also be expressed using
a propositional extension of the modal µ-calculus with modalities for approximant modi-
fication [21,22]. These various extensions of the µ-calculus with explicit approximants all
retain the desirable property of being endogenous logics.
When a proof system is formulated for an expressive temporal logic, such as the modal
µ-calculus, there is no hope of achieving a general completeness theorem, even for basic
sequents of the form ⇒ p : A with p a closed process. Indeed, whenever the model
checking problem, of whether pA holds, is undecidable, completeness cannot hold for
any proof system in which derivable assertions are recursively enumerable, because one
would then be able to decide pA via semidecision procedures for  p :A and  p : ¬A.
Such undecidability, and hence incompleteness, results apply even to the simplest process
algebras containing parallel and recursion, such as BPP [12].
Because unqualified completeness results are unavailable, one instead seeks restricted
completeness results for cases in which such results are, at least, achievable in theory.
Sequent calculus has proved a successful platform for obtaining such results. The results
of the present paper deal comprehensively with the case in which the logic is restric-
ted to Hennessy–Milner logic. For the modal µ-calculus, sequent-based proof systems
based on tableau-style unfolding have yielded several restricted completeness theorems.
By a reduction to Walukiewicz’ completeness theorem for Kozen’s axiomatization of µ-
calculus validity [29], Dam and Gurov established completeness for sequents of the form
⇒ x :A [11]. Also, Dam showed that tableau-based methods yield completeness for the
model checking problem for finite state processes [7,8]. Recently, Schöpp and I have
extended this latter result to important classes of infinite state processes: context-free
processes [20,21] and pushdown processes [22].
Of equal importance to such theoretical completeness results is the question of practical
completeness: does a proof system suffice to establish the verification goals needed in
practice? The only way to investigate this question is by means of case studies. Such case
studies have been carried out within adaptations of the sequent-based proof system to richer
process languages and other computational paradigms. For example, related proof systems
have been developed for the π-calculus [9,6], Erlang [10,13] and JavaCard [3]. As well
as demonstrating the adaptability of the methods of the present paper, this accumulating
body of work does seem to confirm that sequent-based reasoning is a viable approach to
the formal verification of programs.
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